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The realization of devices that harness the laws of quantum me-
chanics represents an exciting challenge at the interface of modern
technology and fundamental science. An exemplary paragon of the
power of such quantum primitives is the concept of “quantum
money” [Wiesner S (1983) ACM SIGACT News 15:78–88]. A dishon-
est holder of a quantum bank note will invariably fail in any coun-
terfeiting attempts; indeed, under assumptions of ideal measure-
ments and decoherence-free memories such security is guaranteed
by the no-cloning theorem. In any practical situation, however,
noise, decoherence, and operational imperfections abound. Thus,
the development of secure “quantum money”-type primitives
capable of tolerating realistic infidelities is of both practical and
fundamental importance. Here, we propose a novel class of such
protocols and demonstrate their tolerance to noise; moreover, we
prove their rigorous security by determining tight fidelity thresh-
olds. Our proposed protocols require only the ability to prepare,
store, and measure single quantum bit memories, making their
experimental realization accessible with current technologies.
Contrary to classical intuition, possession of an object carryingquantum information does not guarantee that the holder can
extract a complete description. Although measurements may
provide partial access, they do not necessarily allow for a full re-
construction of the original quantum state. Wiesner realized that
such quantum properties might enable the design of a quantum
“bank note,” which is fundamentally immune to counterfeiting.
Recent extensions to Wiesner’s original “quantum money” pro-
tocol (1) have garnered significant interest (2–7). One particular
extension enables the authentication of quantum tokens via clas-
sical public communication with a trusted verifier (8). However,
to tolerate noise, the verification process must condone a certain
finite fraction of quantum bit (qubit failures); naturally, such a
relaxation of the verification process enhances the ability for a
dishonest user to forge quantum tokens. It is exactly this interplay
that we, here, seek to address, by focusing on a class of “quantum
token”-protocols that involve either direct physical or classical-
communication verification of qubit memories.
Analysis
Quantum Ticket (Qticket). Our approach to quantum tokens ex-
tends the original quantum money primitive (1) by ensuring
tolerance to finite errors associated with encoding, storage and
decoding of individual quantum bits (qubits). We denote the
tokens within our first primitive as quantum tickets (qtickets);
each qticket is issued by the mint and consists of a unique serial
number andN component quantum states, ρ ¼⨂iρi, where each
ρi is drawn uniformly at random from the set, ~Q ¼ fjþi; j−i;
j þ ii; j − ii; j0i; j1ig, of polarization eigenstates of the Pauli spin
operators. The mint secretly stores a classical description of ρ,
distributed only among trusted verifiers. In order to redeem a
qticket, the holder physically deposits it with a trusted verifier,
who measures the qubits in the relevant basis. This verifier then
requires a minimum fraction, Ftol, of correct outcomes in order
to authenticate the qticket; following validation, the only infor-
mation returned by the verifier is whether the qticket has been
accepted or rejected.
The soundness of a qticket, i.e., the probability that an honest
user is successfully verified, depends crucially on the experimen-
tal fidelities associated with single qubit encoding, storage, and
decoding. Thus, for a given qubit ρi, we define the map,Mi, which
characterizes the overall fidelity, beginning with the mint’s encod-
ing and ending with the verifier’s validation; the average channel
fidelity (9) is then given by, Fi ¼ 1∕j ~Qj∑ρi Tr½ρiMiðρiÞ. With this
definition, the verification probability of an honest user is
ph ¼
1
jQj∑
ρ∈Q
Tr½PaccMðρÞ ≥ 1 − e−NDðFexp‖FtolÞ; [1]
whereQ ¼ ~Q⊗N , Pacc represents the projector onto the subspace
of valid qtickets, M ¼⨂iMi, Fexp ¼ 1∕N∑iFi is the per qubit
average experimental fidelity, and the relative entropy D is a
measure of distinguishability between two binary probability dis-
tributions. Crucially, so long as the average experimental fidelity
associated with single qubit processes is greater than the toler-
ance fidelity, an honest user is exponentially likely to be verified.
We consider each qubit in a qticket to be in one of six possible
states; no more than one bit of information may be extracted by
measuring the actual state, which is insufficient to recover the
original classical description (10). Producing counterfeits without
going through a classical description provides a more powerful
approach. However, optimal cloning results, which represent a
quantitative formulation of the celebrated no-cloning theorem
(11) provide tight restrictions on the quality of such “duplicates”
(12). Our security proof can be seen as an extension of these re-
sults; in particular, we demonstrate that any attempts to forge two
copies from a single qticket will lead at least one of the copies to
be sufficiently imperfect, ultimately yielding its rejection at the
hands of a trusted verifier.
To determine a tight security threshold, we consider the coun-
terfeiting of a single qticket. For a given tolerance fidelity (Ftol)
set by the verifiers, a qticket is only accepted if at least FtolN
qubits are validated. In the event that a dishonest user attempts
to generate two qtickets from a single valid original, each must
contain a minimum of FtolN valid qubits to be authenticated.
As depicted in Fig. 1A, in order for each counterfeit qticket to
contain FtolN valid qubits, a minimum of ð2Ftol − 1ÞN qubits
must have been perfectly cloned. Thus, for a set tolerance fidelity,
in order for a dishonest user to succeed, he or she must be able to
emulate a qubit cloning fidelity of at least 2Ftol − 1. Crucially, so
long as this fidelity is above that achievable for optimal qubit
cloning (2∕3) (12), a dishonest user is exponentially unlikely to
succeed:
pd ¼
1
jQj∑
ρ∈Q
Tr½P⊗2accTðρÞ ≤ e−NDð2Ftol−1‖2∕3Þ; [2]
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where T represents any completely positive trace preserving
(CPTP) qticket counterfeiting map. To ensure 2Ftol − 1 > 2∕3,
the tolerance fidelity must be greater than 5∕6, which is precisely
the average fidelity of copies produced by an optimal qubit
cloning map (12). In certain cases, an adversary may be able to
sequentially engage in multiple verification rounds; however, the
probability of successfully validating counterfeited qtickets grows
at most quadratically in the number of such rounds, and hence,
the likelihood of successful counterfeiting can remain exponen-
tially small even for polynomially large numbers of verifications.
Rigorous statement and proofs of these claims are published as
SI Text available online.
Classic Verification Qticket (CV-Qticket). Our previous discussion of
qtickets assumed that such tokens are physically transferable to
trusted verifiers (e.g., concert tickets); however, in many situa-
tions, this assumption of physical deposition may either be impos-
sible or undesirable. Recently, it has been shown (8) that it
remains possible, even remotely, for a holder to prove the validity
of a token by responding to a set of “challenge” questions; these
questions can only be successfully answered by measuring an
authentic token. Core to this approach, is to ensure that the
challenge questions reveal no additional information about the
quantum state of the token. The holder of a valid token should
be capable of answering any single challenge question correctly
yet be restricted to an exponentially small probability of satisfac-
torily answering two of them.
We now discuss a specific realization of such an approach, the
classical verification quantum ticket (cv-qticket), and demon-
strate its robustness against noise and operational imperfections.
In contrast to the case of bare qtickets, a cv-qticket holder will be
expected to answer challenge questions and hence to measure
qubits himself. Our treatment will contemplate the possibility of
a dishonest holder participating simultaneously in multiple re-
mote verifications, which could in principle offer the counterfei-
ter an additional advantage with respect to the qticket scenario; in
particular, certain measurement strategies, which may be chosen
posterior to receiving a set of challenge questions, may yield an
increased likelihood for multiple successful authentications.
One example of a cv-qticket framework utilizes as a building
block a set of eight possible two-qubit product states, each con-
sisting of two polarization eigenstates (one alongX and the other
along Z):
S ¼ fj0;þi; j0; −i; j1;þi; j1; −i; jþ; 0i; j−; 0i; jþ; 1i; j−; 1ig:
These states constitute a minimal set with the following proper-
ties: (1) Only preparation and measurement of qubit states is
required. (2) Each state enables the deterministic answering of
either of two complementary challenge questions (for example,
a request to measure both X polarizations or both Z polariza-
tions), thus, automatically ensuring soundness in the case of per-
fect experimental fidelity. (3) When attempting to use the state to
answer two complementary challenges from independent veri-
fiers, on average, only 1þ 1∕ ﬃﬃﬃ2p of replies is correct; thus allowing
a dishonest user to emulate an experimental fidelity (per qubit) of
no more than 1∕2þ 1∕ ﬃﬃﬃ8p ≈ 0.85 with respect to each verifier.
We then envision each cv-qticket to consist of n blocks, each
containing r qubit pairs, and thus, a total of n × r × 2 qubits; as
before, each of the qubit pairs is chosen uniformly at random
from S. A challenge question consists of requesting the holder
to measure each block (of qubits) along a basis chosen randomly
among either X or Z; naturally, as depicted in Table 1, a valid
qubit pair (within a block) is one in which the holder correctly
answers the orientation for the particular qubit (within the pair)
that was prepared along the questioned basis. For a given toler-
ance threshold F cvtol, an overall answer will only be deemed correct
if at least F cvtolr orientations within each of the n blocks are found
valid. The motivation for taking blocks of 2r qubits is to exponen-
tially suppress the probability that a counterfeiter provides more
than 2F cvtolr > ð1þ 1∕
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p Þr correct answers among two comple-
mentary challenge blocks. In turn, because any two verifiers
choose the questions for each block independently and at ran-
dom, the probability that there exist no complementary blocks
scales exponentially with the number of blocks as 2−n. By con-
trast, if one were to dismiss this block structure, an adversary
would be able to emulate a larger average experimental fidelity
(3∕4þ 1∕ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ32p ≈ 0.93) by choosing a measurement basis for each
pair dependent on whether the corresponding requests are coin-
ciding or complementary.
By analogy to the qticket case, honest users are exponentially
likely to be verified so long as Fexp > F cvtol; in particular, because
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Fig. 1. (A) Depicts the pigeonhole type argument that is utilized in the proof
of qticket soundness. For a tolerance fidelity Ftol, a qticket is only successfully
authenticated if it contains at least FtolN valid qubits. However, for two coun-
terfeit qtickets, not all valid qubits must coincide. The minimum number of
perfectly cloned qubits enabling both qtickets to be accepted is ð2Ftol − 1ÞN.
(B) Depicts the quantum retrieval type situation envisioned for cv-qtickets.
For two verifiers asking complementary “challenge” questions, the optimal
strategy is for the user to measure in an intermediate basis. Such a strategy
saturates the tolerance threshold, F cvtol ¼ 1þ1∕
ﬃﬃ
2
p
2 .
Table 1. Verification of a single cv-qticket. Here, we consider a cv-qticket with n ¼ 2 and r ¼ 4,
totaling eight qubit pairs and Ftol ¼ 3∕4 (for illustrative purposes only). The prepared qubit-pairs
are chosen at random, as are the bank’s requested measurement bases (for each block). The
holder’s answer has at most, a single error per block, which according to Ftol ¼ 3∕4 is allowed.
Secure cv-qtickets require Ftol > 1∕2þ 1∕
ﬃﬃﬃ
8
p
and a larger number of constituent qubits
Prepare j−; 0i j0;þi j1;þi j0;þi j0;þi jþ; 1i j−; 0i j1;þi
B:Ask Z X
H:Answer 0,0 0,1 1,1 0,1 −,+ +,− −,+ +,−
Correct block ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ×
✓ ✓
B:Result Verified
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there now exist n blocks of qubits, each of which can be thought of
as an individual qticket (with r qubits),
pcvh ≥ ð1 − e−rDðFexp‖F
cv
tolÞÞn: [3]
The proof of cv-qticket security is based upon a generalized form-
alism of quantum retrieval games (8, 13), in combination with a
generalized Chernoff–Hoeffding bound (14) (details in SI Text).
So long as F cvtol > 1∕2þ 1∕
ﬃﬃﬃ
8
p
, a dishonest user is exponentially
unlikely to be authenticated by two independent verifiers. Inter-
estingly, the threshold 1∕2þ 1∕ ﬃﬃﬃ8p corresponds exactly to that
achievable by either covariant qubit cloning (15) or by measure-
ment in an intermediate basis (Fig. 1B), suggesting that both such
strategies may be optimal (16). Similar to the qticket case, one
finds that a dishonest user is exponentially likely to fail:
pcvd ≤
v
2
 
2
ð1∕2þ e−rDðF cvtol‖1∕2þ1∕
ﬃﬃ
8
p ÞÞn; [4]
where v represents the number of repeated verification attempts.
We note that the factor of ðv
2
Þ2 results from a combinatorial state-
ment accounting for the possibility of choosing which challenge
question to answer first and then waiting for feedback from the
verifier. Thus, so long as the hierarchy of fidelities is such that
1∕2þ 1∕ ﬃﬃﬃ8p < F cvtol < Fexp, it is possible to prove both soundness
and security of the cv-qtickets protocol (see SI Text for rigorous
statement and proofs).
Applications. Next, we consider applications of the above primi-
tives to practically relevant protocols. For instance, one might
imagine a composite cv-qticket that allows for multiple verifica-
tion rounds while also ensuring that the token cannot be split into
two independently valid subparts (8). Such a construction may
be used to create a quantum-protected credit card. Indeed, the
classical communication that takes place with the issuer (bank) to
verify the cv-qticket (via challenge questions) may be intention-
ally publicized to a merchant who needs to be convinced of the
card’s validity. By contrast to modern credit card implementa-
tions, such a quantum credit card would be unforgeable and
hence immune to fraudulent charges (Fig. 2A).
An alternate advantage offered by the qticket framework is
evinced in the case where verifiers may not possess a secure com-
munication channel with each other. Consider, for example, a dis-
honest user who seeks to copy multiple concert tickets, enabling
his henchmen to enter at different checkpoint gates. A classical
solution would involve gate verifiers communicating amongst one
another to ensure that each ticket serial number is only allowed
entry a single time; however, as shown in Fig. 2B, such a safeguard
can be overcome in the event that communication has been
severed. By contrast, a concert ticket based upon the proposed
qticket primitive would be automatically secure against such a
scenario; indeed, the security of qtickets is guaranteed even when
verifiers are assumed to be isolated. Such isolation may be espe-
cially useful for applications involving quantum identification
tokens, where multiple verifiers may exist who are either unable
or unwilling to communicate with one another.
Discussion
Although quantum primitives have been the subject of tremen-
dous theoretical interest, their practical realization demands ro-
bustness in the face of realistic imperfections. Our above analysis
demonstrates that such noise tolerance can be achieved for
certain classes of unforgeable quantum tokens. Moreover, the
derived tolerance thresholds are remarkably mild and suggest
that proof of principle experiments are currently accessible in
systems ranging from trapped ions (17, 18) and superconducting
devices (19, 20) to solid-state spins (21–25). In particular, recent
advances on single nuclear spins situated in a compact room-
temperature solid have demonstrated that ultralong storage times
can be attained in combination with high fidelity initialization and
readout (24); such advances suggest that quantum devices based
upon single qubit quantum memories may be both practical and
realistically feasible.
Although our analysis has focused on describing a primitive
based upon single tokens, natural extensions to the case of multi-
ple identical quantum tokens open up the possibility of even more
novel applications. In particular, as detailed in the SI Text, it is
possible to extend our threshold results to the case where c iden-
tical copies of the quantum token are issued. In this case, to en-
sure that the production of cþ 1 valid tokens is exponentially
improbable, the required threshold fidelity must be greater than
1 − 1ðcþ1Þðcþ2Þ. The existence of such multiple identical tokens can
provide a certain degree of anonymity for users and could be
employed in primitives such as quantum voting. A crucial ques-
tion that remains is whether a rigorous proof of anonymity can be
obtained in a noisy environment. Furthermore, our proposed
quantum tokens can also be seen as a basic noise tolerant building
block for implementing more advanced application schemes;
such schemes can range from novel implementations of quantum
key distribution (16, 26,–28) based upon physical qubit transport
to complex one-time-entry identification cards. Beyond these
specific applications, a number of scientific avenues can be
explored, including for example, understanding whether an inter-
play between computational assumptions and quantummemories
can yield fundamentally new approaches to encryption.
Appendix
We now outline the proof for the security of the qticket protocol
that is fully developed in the online SI Text. First, the claim in
Eq. 2 is restated in terms of an equivalent one, which averages
over the set of all pure product states instead of over Q. This
reformulation is achieved by invoking the three-design property
for the set ~Q, i.e., the fact that degree three polynomials in the
state may equivalently be averaged over ~Q or over all possible
pure qubit states. An explicit expression for Pacc is used to show
that the security statement has degree three in each component.
We then bound the average cloning probability for the set of
k-qubit pure product states by ð2∕3Þk, following the lines of
A
B
Fig. 2. (A) Depicts the possibility of using the cv-qticket framework to
implement a quantum-protected credit card. Unlike its classical counterpart,
the quantum credit card would naturally be unforgeable, preventing thieves
from being able to simply copy credit card information and perform remote
purchases. (B) Depicts a dishonest user who attempts to copy a concert qtick-
et (e.g., same serial number), enabling his friend to enter at an alternate
checkpoint gate. Naively, each verifier can communicate with one another
to prevent such abusive ticket cloning. However, such a safeguard can be
overcome in the event that the communication among verifiers is either
unsecured, unavailable, or severed (possibly by the dishonest user himself).
The qticket is exempt from this type of attack because security is guaranteed
even in the case of isolated verifiers.
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the original proof of optimal cloning by Werner (12). This bound
can be seen as limiting the possibility of positively correlating the
successful cloning of different components. From this hypothesis,
a generalized Chernoff bound (14) applicable to (possibly) de-
pendent random variables allows us to infer the validity of Eq. 2.
Finally, the security with respect to v consecutive verification at-
tempts, allowing for an adaptive counterfeiting strategy, is bound
in terms of the situation of Eq. 2, where a map on a single qticket
produces two counterfeits. In particular, we sum over the possible
verification outcomes containing at least two positive replies and
grouping these into ðv
2
Þ disjoint scenarios. In turn, by fixing the
initial verifier replies of each scenario, the adaptive counterfeit-
ing strategy can be reinterpreted as a counterfeiting map.
We now sketch the security proof for cv-qtickets. Abstractly,
cv-qtickets consist of a set of randomly produced states and
requested challenge questions on these states. The formalism
of quantum retrieval games (QRGs) specifically models this
scenario (8, 13), allowing one to bound the probability with which
optimal strategies can provide correct answers. This framework is
presented in a largely self-contained manner because its general-
ity and potential make it of independent interest. Using only the
basic definitions for QRGs and some simple properties, we prove
that, on average, given a state randomly chosen from S, and the
two complementary challenge questions no more than 1þ 1∕ ﬃﬃﬃ2p
of them may be answered satisfactorily. Generalized Chernoff
bounds (14) are then applied to bound the likelihood of succeed-
ing at threshold games, i.e., composite games where the correct-
ness of an answer corresponds to correctly providing a certain
fraction of the answer components. Full cv-qtickets are then mod-
elled as QRG for scenarios in which the holder of a cv-qticket
wishes to simultaneously answer questions from two independent
verifiers without any additional aid. Finally, a combinatorial
argument, similar to the one used for qtickets, is used to provide
a polynomial upper bound on how the double verification prob-
ability may increase with the number v of verification attempts.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We thank Y. Chu, C. R. Laumann, and S. D. Bennett
for insights and discussions. This work was supported in part by Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) (SFB 631 and Nanosystem Initiative München
NIM), Quantun Computing, Control and Communication (QCCC) elite network
Bayern, the European Union project MALICIA, Catalunya Caixa, the National
Basic Research Program of China (NBRPC) (973 program), the National Science
Foundation (NSF), the Center for Ultracold Atoms (CUA), the Department of
Energy (FG0297ER25308), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) quantum entanglement science and technology (QuEST), Multi
University Research Initiative (MURI), Packard Foundation and the Sherman
Fairchild Foundation.
1. Wiesner S (1983) Conjugate coding. ACM SIGACT News 15:78–88.
2. Aaronson S (2009) Quantum Copy-Protection and Quantum Money (IEEE, Los Alami-
tos, CA), pp 229–242.
3. Lutomirski A, et al. (2009) Breaking and making quantum money: Toward a new
quantum cryptographic protocol. arXiv:0912.3825.
4. Mosca M, Stebila D (2010) Quantum coins. Error-correcting codes, finite geometries
and cryptography. Proc Am Math Soc 523:35–47.
5. Farhi E, et al. (2010) Quantum state restoration and single-copy tomography for
ground states of Hamiltonians. Phys Rev Lett 105:190503–190506.
6. Farhi E, Gosset D, Hassidim A, Lutomirski A, Shor P (2010) Quantummoney from knots.
arXiv:1004.5127.
7. Lutomirski A (2011) Component mixers and a hardness result for counterfeiting
quantum money. arXiv:1107.0321.
8. Gavinsky D (2011) Quantummoney with classical verification. Proceedings of the 2012
IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity (CCC) (IEEE Porto, Portugal), pp 42–52.
9. Nielsen MA (2002) A simple formula for the average gate fidelity of a quantum
dynamical operation. Phys Lett A 303:249–252.
10. Holevo A (1973) Statistical problems in quantum physics. Proceedings of the Second
Japan-USSR Symposiumon Probability Theory. LNM, eds GMaruyama and Y Prokhorov
(Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg), Vol. 330, pp 104–119.
11. Wootters WK, Zurek WH (1982) A single quantum cannot be cloned. Nature
299:802–803.
12. Werner RF (1998) Optimal cloning of pure states. Phys Rev A 58:1827–1832.
13. Gutoski G, Watrous J (2007) Toward a general theory of quantum games, STOC 2007
(ACM, New York, NY), pp 565–574.
14. Impagliazzo R, Kabanets V (2010) Constructive proofs of concentration bounds.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (APROX 2010)/(RANDOM 2010), eds M Serna,
R Shaltiel, K Jansen, and J Rolim (Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg), Vol. 6302, pp 617–631.
15. Bruss D, Cinchetti M, Mauro D’Ariano G, Macchiavello C (2000) Phase-covariant quan-
tum cloning. Phys Rev A 62:012302–012308.
16. Gisin N, Ribordy G, Tittel W, Zbinden H (2002) Quantum cryptography. Rev Mod Phys
74:145–195.
17. Hume DB, Rosenband T, Wineland DJ (2007) High-fidelity adaptive qubit detection
through repetitive quantum non-demolition measurements. Phys Rev Lett
99:120502–120505.
18. Langer C, et al. (2005) Long-lived qubit memory using atomic ions. Phys Rev Lett
95:060502.
19. Wendin G (2003) Scalable solid-state qubits: Challenging decoherence and read-out.
Phil Trans R Soc A 361:1323–1338.
20. Gladchenko S, et al. (2009) Superconducting nanocircuits for topologically protected
qubits. Nat Phys 5:48–53.
21. Dutt MVG, et al. (2007) Quantum register based on individual electronic and nuclear
spin qubits in diamond. Science 316:1312–1316.
22. Morton JJL, et al. (2008) Solid-state quantum memory using the 31P nuclear spin.
Nature 455:1085–1088.
23. Balasubramanian G, et al. (2009) Ultralong spin coherence time in isotopically engi-
neered diamond. Nat Mater 8:383–387.
24. Maurer PC, et al. (2012) Room-temperature quantum bit memory exceeding one
second. Science 336:1283–1286.
25. Steger M, et al. (2012) Quantum information storage for over 180 s using donor spins
in a 28Si “semiconductor vacuum”. Science 336:1280–1283.
26. Bennet CH, Brassard G (1984) Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin
tossing. Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Computers Systems and
Signal Processing pp 175–179.
27. Gottesman D, Lo H (2003) Proof of security of quantum key distribution with two-way
classical communications. IEEE Trans Inf Theory 49:457–475.
28. Scarani V, Renner R (2008) Quantum cryptographywith finite resources: Unconditional
security bound for discrete-variable protocols with one-way postprocessing. Phys Rev
Lett 100:200501.
16082 ∣ www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1203552109 Pastawski et al.
